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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare effects of informational intermediation. A (shortlived) seller sets the price of a product that is sold through a (long-lived) informational
intermediary. The intermediary can disclose information about the product to consumers, earns a fixed percentage of the sales revenue in each period, and has concerns
about its prominence—the market size it faces in the future, which in turn is increasing
in past consumer surplus. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibria and the set
of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of this game and show that when the market
feedback (i.e., how much past consumer surplus affects future market sizes) increases,
welfare may decrease in the Pareto sense.
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Introduction

In many markets, products are sold through an intermediary, who facilitates trade and provides product information to consumers before they make purchasing decisions. For example,
in securities markets, financial advisors serve as intermediaries through which issuers sell securities to investors. At the same time, they provide information about financial products
to investors. In insurance markets, insurance companies collaborate with insurance brokers
who then persuade customers to buy these companies’ insurance plans by providing more
detailed information. Similarly, in the emerging online market, intermediaries such as influencers and key opinion leaders (KOL) provide product information to their followers, who
then use that information to make purchase decisions. These informational intermediaries
participate in the market by connecting product sellers with potential customers to whom
they disclose product information. Moreover, such intermediaries often share two common
features: (i) one of their common sources of income is through retaining a certain percentage
of sales revenue as commission fees from product sellers;1 and (ii) they have concerns about
their own prominence, which evolves over time and depends on past consumers’ satisfaction
(e.g., positive experiences would lead to better reviews and more referral, which in turn
make the intermediary more prominent in the future). Since an intermediary’s prominence
reflects the size of the market it faces, when interacting with a product seller, a forwardlooking and revenue-maximizing informational intermediary would be market-minded. After
all, the intermediary’s long-term profit depends not only on sales revenues but also on its
own prominence, which in turn is affected by consumers’ satisfaction. Consequently, the
level of market feedback —the degree to which consumers’ satisfaction affect the intermediary’s future prominence—would be crucial for understanding the intermediary’s incentives,
as well as welfare outcomes.2 Higher level of market feedback means consumers’ satisfaction
1

While it is more common in practice that traditional intermediaries like insurance brokers and financial
brokers are paid through commissions, such arrangements in the market for influencers may be seemingly less
frequent. Nevertheless, one of the major income sources for online influencers are affiliated links. Namely,
product sellers would partner with third party websites such as rStyle or ShopStyle, and then invite influencers
to present information about their products to consumers while sharing the affiliated link generated by these
third parties. These affiliated links can keep track of where each purchase is directed from, and the influencers
will then be paid a fixed share of the revenue per purchase. For our purpose, this business model can also be
thought of as a revenue-sharing arrangement between sellers and influencers.
2
The level of market feedback can be affected by various factors. For example, market feedback level
may be higher if the underlying communicative network among potential customers is more connected (i.e.,
the degree to which consumers engage in word-of-mouth after purchasing); if past customers have a better
channel to leave reviews and deliver them to future customers more transparently (i.e., better rating system
and better recommendation algorithm); if more consumers have alternatives to an intermediary (i.e., more
intense competition among intermediaries); or if intermediaries are more specialized in information provision
and provide fewer other services.
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is more consequential to the intermediary’s future prominence, and hence would lead to a
more market-minded intermediary who assigns more weights to consumers’ satisfaction when
disclosing information. In contrast, lower level of market feedback means consumers’ satisfaction has little impact on the intermediary’s future prominence, and hence the intermediary
is driven more by short-term revenue rather then consumers’ satisfaction.
This paper studies how market feedback affects welfare in the presence of a market-minded
informational intermediary. Specifically, since the level market feedback directly translates
to the degree to which an informational intermediary is market-minded, a natural question
follows: Does higher level market feedback always benefit consumers? Or more generally,
how would market feedback affect welfare outcomes of the entire economy? In this paper, we
show that not only is it possible that higher market feedback does not benefit the consumers,
welfare might even decrease in the Pareto sense as the level of market feedback increases—
leading to unintended welfare losses.
Specifically, we consider a dynamic game in discrete time with a (sequence of) short-lived
seller (he) and a long-lived informational intermediary (she). In each period, a mass of shortlived consumers arrive. These consumers have unit demands and differentiated values, but
do not observe their own values upon arrival. The seller first posts a price for his product.
After observing the price, the intermediary then discloses information about the product to
consumers so that they receive signals about their own values. With the information provided
by the intermediary, each consumer then decides whether to buy the product. Lastly, the
intermediary retains a fixed percentage of the sales revenue as commission fees. To model
the feature that the intermediary’s prominence (i.e., the mass of consumers who arrived in
each period) depends on past customers’ satisfaction, we assume that the mass of consumers
arriving in each period (market size) depends on past consumer surplus. Specifically, we
assume that market growth rate in each period is a nondecreasing affine function of the
average consumer surplus in that period, with its slope being interpreted as the level of
market feedback. As a result, the market size in period t + 1 onward would be larger if the
average consumer surplus is higher in period t, and this effect is stronger when the market
feedback is higher.
The result of unintended welfare loss is established by completely characterizing the equilibrium outcomes in our model. We first restrict attention to stationary-Markov perfect
equilibrium outcomes (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2). When the market feedback level is low,
there is a unique stationary-Markov perfect equilibrium outcome where the intermediary
provides no information to consumers and the seller fully extracts all the surplus by charging
a price that equals to the expected value. In this case, the consumer surplus is zero. As
the market feedback level increases but remains below a certain threshold, the intermediary
would begin to provide some information to consumers. The information provided is such
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that all consumers with values above a (nonzero) cutoff have the same interim expected
value, which in turn equals to the price posted by the seller. As a result, consumer surplus
remains zero and sales revenue becomes lower than the expected value. Moreover, as the
market feedback increases, the equilibrium price increases and the sales revenue decreases,
leading to Pareto inferior outcomes.
In addition to stationary-Markov equilibrium outcomes, we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any fixed discount factor and market feedback level,
with (Theorem 3) and without (Theorem 4) a restriction that the intermediary’s present
discounted profits are finite at every history. In both cases, when the market feedback level
is below a certain threshold, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that is
Pareto-dominated by all other outcomes. Moreover, similar to the stationary-Markov perfect
equilibrium outcomes, this Pareto-worst outcome becomes even worse (in the Pareto sense)
as market feedback increases.
Together, the main characterizations suggest that higher market feedback may not benefit
the consumers, and can even lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. This unintended welfare loss
stems from the intrinsic structure of markets with an informational intermediary. After all,
when an intermediary interacts with a product seller, the intermediary’s incentives to bolster
her future prominence creates difference in interest between her and the seller. On one hand,
since the seller only interacts with the intermediary in the short term, the intermediary’s
future prominence is irrelevant to him and thus he only seeks to maximize current sales
revenue. On the other hand, the intermediary is forward-looking and thus her profit depends
on both current sales revenue and her future prominence, and the latter in turn depends on
current consumer surplus. As a result, in each period and at any given price, the intermediary
would prefer steering more consumers with values below the price to not purchasing compared
to what the seller would prefer. Anticipating this, the seller would then charge a higher price
to minimize the mass of consumers steered away by the intermediary, and hence decreasing
efficiency.
Consequently, our results serve as a cautionary tale when it comes to improvements of
market feedback. Increase in the level of market feedback (e.g., due to changes of market
structures or technologies) may be detrimental for the entire market even though it renders a more market-minded intermediary. Meanwhile, policies that seek to improve market
feedback (e.g., improving recommender systems or encouraging consumers’ word-of-mouth
behaviors)—or, from the same regard, policies that aim to incentivize intermediaries to enhance consumer surplus—should be evaluated and implemented carefully. After all, higher
market feedback may be unambiguously undesirable when revenue sharing is the main business model between sellers and intermediaries and when these collaborating relationships are
relatively short-term. To address these concerns, we show in Section 6 that such unintended
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welfare losses can be avoided either by transforming the revenue sharing business model to a
subscription model or a customer-base monetization model, by imposing a cap on the market
growth rate, or by establishing a long-term relationship between the product seller and the
intermediary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below discusses the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model. We then characterize the stationary-Markov
perfect equilibrium outcomes in Section 4, as well as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs
in Section 5. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss several policy implications and extensions,
respectively. Section 8 then concludes.

2

Related Literature

This paper is related to the rapidly growing literature on information design and pricing,
which introduces the design of information to various market structures, including consumer
search (e.g., Anderson and Renault (2006), Board and Lu (2018), Au and Whitmeyer (2021),
and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2021)); monopoly (e.g., Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015), Roesler and Szentes (2017), Du (2018), Ravid, Roseler, and Szentes (forthcoming), and Libgober and Mu (2021));3 oligopoly (e.g., Boleslavsky, Hwang, and Kim (2019),
Armstrong and Zhou (forthcoming); and Elliot, Galeotti, Koh, and Li (2021)); auctions (e.g.,
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Shi (2012), Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017), Chen
and Yang (2020), Kim and Koh (2021), Brooks and Du (2021), and Terstiege and Wasser
(forthcoming)); and third-party intermediation (e.g., Yang (2019) and Yang (forthcoming)).
Among the aforementioned papers, our model is closer to Roesler and Szentes (2017),
Ravid, Roseler, and Szentes (forthcoming), Du (2018), Libgober and Mu (2021), and Yang
(2019). Similar to our model, all these papers involve designs of consumers’ information
structures in a monopolistic pricing setting. Specifically, Roesler and Szentes (2017) characterizes the surplus-maximizing information for consumers in a monopolistic setting, where
the monopolist always posts a price optimally based on the information structure consumers
have. Ravid, Roseler, and Szentes (forthcoming) characterizes the equilibrium outcomes when
the monopolist posts a price and consumers acquire information simultaneously. Du (2018)
solves for a robust selling mechanism (i.e., randomized posted price) that maximizes the
seller’s revenue guarantee, where the Nature always chooses the worst case consumer information given the selected mechanism. Libgober and Mu (2021) considers a dynamic pricing
problem where consumers can delay purchases and the seller can commit to a price path,
and the Nature chooses in each period the worst-case consumer information after observing
3

See also: Haghpanah and Siegel (2020), Haghpanah and Siegel (forthcoming), Deb and Roesler (2021)
and Yang (2021) for multi-product counterparts; as well as Doval and Skreta (2021) for a monopolist with
limited commitment.
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the realized price. Yang (2019) introduces an informational intermediary who contracts with
the seller (with a private cost) on what information to disclose to consumers. The seller then
chooses an optimal selling mechanism based on the information structure provided by the
intermediary. In this paper, we consider a dynamic game where each stage game involves a
monopolist posting a price first, and then an intermediary choosing an information structure
for consumers. From this regard, pricing and information disclosure occur in every period in
our model.4 Moreover, since the informational intermediary in our paper is long-lived, future
continuation plays could affect current information disclosed by the intermediary, which in
turn affects outcomes.
Meanwhile, since the intermediary seeks to enhance and maintain its prominence, which
in turn depends on the intermediary’s behavior in the past, our paper is also related to the
reputation literature, including its general theory (e.g., Fundenberg and Levine (1989) and
Fundenberg and Levine (1992)); its effects on firms’ competition and on inducing efficient
effort levels (e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Hörner (2002)); and its effect on an
expert’s credibility and their ability to communicate information (e.g., Ely and Välimäki
(2003), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), and Vong (2021b)). A key distinction of our paper is
that we abstract from the endogenous formulation of reputation and model the intermediary’s
concern about its prominence via an exogenous market-evolution process, so that the market
growth rate in each period is an (exogenous) function of consumer surplus in the same period,
whose shape can in turn be interpreted as results of different communication network among
consumers and their word-of-mouth behaviors (see, for example, Chakraborty, Deb, and
Öry (2021)); different rating systems (see, for example, Che and Hörner (2018), Hörner and
Lambert (2021), and Vellodi (2021)); or the degree of competition (see Section 7). In the
meantime, our assumption that the market growth rate depends only on consumer surplus in
the same period resembles models where there is only limited record (e.g., Liu (2011) and Liu
and Skrzypacz (2014)). In particular, while obtained by different reasons, our unintended
welfare loss result has a similar flavor as the result of Bar-Isaac and Deb (2021), who show
that more audiences observing past histories in the future may lead to worse outcomes for
an agent with reputation concerns.
4

Furthermore, even when restricting to stationary-Markov perfect equilibria, a stage game in our model
is different from the aforementioned papers: The seller chooses selling mechanisms either after or while the
information structure is chosen in Roesler and Szentes (2017) and Ravid, Roseler, and Szentes (forthcoming),
respectively; while the seller chooses a price before an information structure is chosen in this paper. The
seller can commit to any selling mechanism and the Nature always plays against the seller in Du (2018) and
in Libgober and Mu (2021); while the seller is restricted to posted price mechanisms and the information
structure is chosen to maximize a linear combination of the sales revenue and the consumer surplus in this
paper. In the meantime, our model is similar to that of Libgober and Mu (2021) in that information structures
can be contingent on the posted prices.
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Methodologically, this paper is related to the Bayesian persuasion literature.5 Specifically,
the intermediary’s disclosure problem in our model can be regarded as a persuasion problem
when only the expected value of the state is payoff relevant (see Gentzkow and Kamenica
(2016) and Dworczak and Martini (2019)). Meanwhile, the underlying structure of the game
can be regarded as a dynamic game with a long-lived player and a short lived player, as
studied by Fundenberg and Levine (1989) and Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990), with
an exception that there is a history-dependent state that scales the stage game payoffs.
Moreover, the equilibrium selection criterion we use for this dynamic game in Section 4
follows the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (2001).
In terms of applications, this paper is also related to the certification literature (e.g.,
Biglaiser (1993), Lizzeri (1999), Stahl and Strausz (2017), Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018),
Vong (2021a), and Ali, Haghpanah, Lin, and Siegel (2022)) and the recent literature on online
influencers. In the certification literature, our model is closer to that of Lizzeri (1999), who
studies the optimal disclosure policy of a certifier in a market featuring adverse selection who
can charge the seller a fee in exchange of (credibly) disclosing some information about the
product to buyers. While our informational intermediary also discloses product information
to consumers, she does so after seeing the seller’s price. Moreover, there is no adverse selection
problem in our setting without the presence of the intermediary as sellers do not possess any
private information.
In the literature of online influencers, Fainmesser and Galeotti (2021) study a market
where influencers can be paid to endorse products as sponsored recommendation, but with
an opportunity cost of recommending fewer carefully-selected high-quality products to consumers, which would in turn affect their follower bases. Our model shares a similar spirit
in which the intermediary faces a trade-off between prominence and short-term revenue.
Nonetheless, in addition to having a dynamic model instead of a static one, we focus on the
information provision aspect of an intermediary’s service, rather than product recommendation and endorsement. Moreover, we highlight the business model where intermediaries are
paid through commission rather than a lump-sum transfer. Mitchell (2021) also examines the
economic implications of an influencer’s trade-off between advertisement contents and good
advice, and uses techniques in the dynamic contracting literature to characterize the optimal
dynamic contracts for the follower. Our paper is complementary in the sense that we abstract
from consumers’ long-term endogenous relationships with the intermediary and focus on the
details of pricing and information provision, while Mitchell (2021) abstracts from pricing and
information provision and examines the relationship between the follower and the influencer.
Pei and Mayzlin (forthcoming) studies influencers’ paid promotion contents using a Bayesian
persuasion framework. In their model, a product seller can pay an influencer to increase the
5

See Kamenica (2018) for a comprehensive review.
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likelihood of a positive signal for a given two-state-two-signal Blackwekk experiment. The
main difference between their model and ours is that our intermediary can use any Blackwell
experiment to inform consumers about their values, which cannot be altered by the seller
ex-post.

3

Model

3.1

Primitives

Time t ≥ 0 is discrete. In each period t, a short-lived seller sells one product to a mass
mt ≥ 0 of short-lived consumers with unit demands through a long-lived intermediary with
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). A consumer in period t is denoted by (v, x) ∈ R+ × [0, mt ], where
v denotes the consumer’s value for the product and x denotes consumers’ payoff-irrelevant
identities. Across consumers, v is distributed according to a probability measure described
by a decreasing function D : R+ → [0, 1], so that D(p) is the share of consumers with v ≥ p;
whereas x is distributed according to the Lebesgue measure, so that the mass of consumers
in period t is mt . Assume that D is regular, in the sense that it is continuously differentiable,
has a non-zero derivative on an interval in R+ , and induces a decreasing marginal revenue
function.6 Each consumer knows their payoff-irrelevant type x but has to learn about the
product value v through the information provided by the intermediary.
3.2

Timing and Payoffs

In each period, the timing of moves is as follows: (i) Consumers arrive, (ii) the seller posts a
price, (iii) the intermediary observes the posted price and then provides information about
v to consumers (see Section 3.3), (iv) consumers then decide whether to buy the product
after receiving information and observing the posted price p, (v) payoffs are realized and
consumers observe their values v. Given the outcome, a consumer has payoff v − p if he buys
the product and has payoff zero if he does not buy, while the seller and the intermediary
share the revenue by a fixed proportion α ∈ (0, 1). That is, the seller’s payoff is 1 − α share of
the total revenue and the intermediary’s (stage-game) payoff is α share of the total revenue,
where the total revenue is the posted prices times the trade volume.
The mass of consumers mt who trade through the intermediary (i.e., the market size) in
period t depends on outcomes in previous periods. In period 0, the market size is 1 (i.e.,
m0 = 1). In each period t ≥ 0, the market size mt+1 in period t + 1 is the integral of an
increasing affine function of ex-post surplus across all consumers in period t. In other words,
6

That is, the function q 7→ qD
the Myersoninan sense.

−1

(q) is concave. This is equivalent to assuming that 1 − D is regular in
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after making the purchasing decision at posted price p in period t, the market size mt+1 of
period t + 1 is given by:

Z mt Z ∞
(1)
mt+1 = max
[γ + β · a(p, v, x)(v − p)]D(dv) dx, 0 ,
0

0

for some β ≥ 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1/δ), where a(p, v, x) is the probability that consumer (v, x)
purchases the product at price p, and β measures the market feedback as it governs how
much past consumers surplus could affect future market sizes.
3.3

Information

In each period, consumers receive information about v from the intermediary. A disclosure
policy is a measurable function φ : R+ ×[0, 1] → R. Given any market size m > 0 and any disclosure policy φ, consumer x ∈ [0, m] observes φ(v, x/m). In other words, a disclosure policy
is an individualized partition that discloses information about v to consumers by revealing
them which element of the partition does the product value belong to. The intermediary can
choose any disclosure policy when providing information to the consumers.
Given any market size m > 0 and any disclosure policy φ, consumer x ∈ [0, m] has interim
expected value7

 x 
E v φ v,
.
m
For any p ≥ 0, let
 

Z Z
 x 
1 m ∞
1 E v φ ṽ,
Dφ (p) :=
≥ p D(dṽ) dx
m 0 0
m
Z 1Z ∞
1{E[v|φ(ṽ, u)] ≥ p}D(dṽ) du
=
0

0

denote the (normalized) marginal distribution of consumers’ interim expected values. By the
law of iterated expectation, for any market size m and for any disclosure policy φ,
 
 x 
E E v φ v,
= E[v].
m
Thus, Dφ must be a mean-preserving contraction of D. In fact, the converse is also true (see
Green and Stokey (1978) and Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017)): For any distribution D that
is a mean-preserving contraction of D, there exists a disclosure policy φ such that Dφ = D.
As a result, we may represent the set of all possible disclosure policies by the collection
of distributions that are mean-preserving contractions of D. That is, a disclosure policy is
7

Notice that x/m can be regarded as a random variable that is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and is
independent of v. Thus, the conditional expectation is well-defined.
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R∞
x

R∞
p

D(v) dv

D(v) dv
0

E[v]

p

x

Figure 1: Feasible Disclosure Policies D
D ∈ D, where D is the collection of nonincreasing, upper-semicontinuous functions D : R+ →
[0, 1] such that D(0) = 1 and
Z ∞
Z ∞
D(v) dv ≤
D(v) dv,
(2)
p

p

for all p ≥ 0, with equality at p = 0. The set D is described in Figure 1, where each D ∈ D
corresponds to a decreasing and convex function whose graph is in the highlighted area.
Using this representation, the model can be simplified. First, notice that since consumers
are short-lived and make purchasing decisions after observing the price pt , the disclosure
policy φt and the value of φt , they must purchase the product if their interim expected value
is above pt , and not purchase the product if the interim expected value is below pt . Moreover,
since D ∈ D corresponds to the marginal distribution of consumers’ interim expected values
under disclosure policy D, the trade volume would be m · q for some q ∈ [D(p+ ), D(p)] when
the market size is m, the disclosure policy is D ∈ D, and the posted price is p (i.e., m · D(p)
is the demand at price p under disclosure policy D). This in turn implies that the seller’s
share of revenue would be (1 − α)m · p · q and the intermediary’s share of revenue would be
αm · p · q, for some q ∈ [D(p+ ), D(p)], and the exact q depends on consumers’ tie-breaking
rule.
Moreover, the law of motion (1) for the market sizes can also be simplified. To see this,
notice that given any market size mt > 0, any posted price pt and any disclosure policy φt ,
consumers’ optimal purchasing decision a(pt , v, x) ∈ [0, 1] given (v, x) and pt must be such
that





x

> pt
 1, if E v φ v, mt

a(p, v, x) =




< pt
 0, if E v φ v, mxt
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Thus, by the definition of Dφt and by the law of iterated expectation, (1) can be written as




Z ∞
Z ∞
1{v ≥ pt }(v − pt )Dφt (dv) = mt γ + β
Dφt (v) dv .
mt+1 = mt γ + β
0

pt

Therefore, since the set of disclosure policies is represented by D, given any market size
mt ≥ 0, any posted price pt ≥ 0, and any disclosure policy Dt ∈ D, (1) can be simplifed to


Z ∞
Dt (v) dv .
(3)
mt+1 = mt γ + β
pt

3.4

Strategies and Solution Concepts

Since the consumers’ behavior can be simplified and embedded into the choice of D ∈ D up
to a tie-breaking rule (as noted above), the model can effectively be reduced to a perfect
information extensive form game with a long-lived intermediary, a (sequence of) short-lived
seller, and a (sequence of) short-lived tie-breaker whose payoff is constant across all histories.
In each period t, the market size mt is determined by (3). The seller moves first and posts a
price pt ≥ 0. The intermediary then observes the price and chooses a disclosure policy Dt ∈ D.
The tie-breaker observes both pt and Dt and chooses qt ∈ [Dt (p+
t ), D(pt )]. Payoffs are then
realized so that the intermediary’s and the seller’s payoff are αmt · pt · qt and (1 − α)mt · pt · qt ,
respectively.
As a result, our model can be viewed as a dymamic game with one long-run player (i.e.,
the intermediary) and two (sequences of) short-run players (i.e, a seller and a tie-breaker in
each period) (see Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990)), with two exceptions: (i) the moves
are sequential in each stage game,8 and (ii) there is a deterministically evolving payoffrelevant state variable (i.e., the market size).9 Henceforth, we represent our model using
this dynamic game. In this game, the seller’s strategy is a mapping from past histories10 to
R+ , the intermediary’s strategy is a mapping from past histories and the seller’s price to D,
and the tie-breaker’s strategy is a mapping from past histories, the seller’s price pt , and the
intermediary’s disclosure policy Dt to [Dt (p+
t ), Dt (pt )].
Notice that although stage game payoffs depend on the market size, they are simply scaled.
In particular, market sizes do not affect the players’ preference over stage game outcomes.
In the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (2001), we say that a strategy profile is stationary-Markov
if it does not depend on past histories. That is, a strategy profile is stationary-Markov if
8

This means that when checking the intermediary’s deviations in a period t, we need to consider all
histories induced by prices charged by the seller in period t, even if only one of them would be on-path.
9
One implication of this is that, if the market size is not bounded, the intermediary’s payoff could be
unbounded. As a result, there might be subgame perfect equilibria in which the intermediary’s payoff
diverges at some histories.
10
See the online appendix for a formal definition of histories
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the seller’s price does not depends on past histories, the intermediary’s disclosure policy
only depends on the seller’s price in the same period, and the tie-breaker’s strategy only
depends on the seller’s price and the intermediary’s disclosure policy in the same period. A
subgame perfect equilibrium is said to be stationary-Markov (or simply Markov hereafter) if
it is a stationary-Markov strategy profile. Moreover, a subgame perfect equilibrium is said
to be finite if the intermediary’s continuation value at any history is finite, and is infinite if
otherwise. In Section 4, we first characterize the set of Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Then, Section 5 further characterizes the entire feasible payoff set among all subgame perfect
equilibria.
3.5

Discussions of the Model

Short-lived seller—The seller is assumed to be short-lived. This captures a feature in
markets of informational intermediaries where the collaborating relationships between sellers
and intermediaries are often not long-term. Rather, sellers often search for intermediaries to
collaborate with whenever they introduce a new product. This feature is one of the driving
forces of our main result, as it creates a difference in interest between the seller and the
intermediary. In Section 6.3, we consider an alternative setting where the seller is long-lived
and has the same discount rate as the intermediary’s, capturing a benchmark where the seller
and the intermediary are able to form long-term collaborating relationships. In turns out that
the unintended welfare loss would be eliminated when the seller is long-lived, which highlights
an undesirable welfare consequence of short-term collaborating relationships between sellers
and intermediaries.
Market structure—We assume that both the product seller and the intermediary are monopolists. An interpretation is that while there are many sellers and many intermediaries in
the market, each of them has some market powers. When collaborating with a seller, the
intermediary provides both an exclusive access to a group of consumers (whose volume depends on its prominence) and information. Together with the short-lived seller assumption,
our model can be regarded as the longitudinal section of an intermediary’s life cycle.
Disclosure policy—A disclosure policy in our setting is equivalent to a Blackwell experiment of a single buyer’s value. Therefore, our model of information follows the literature of
consumer information and pricing, where consumers are ex-ante uninformed and can receive
any signal for their own values. As motivated in this literature (see, for instances, Johnson
and Myatt (2006) and Anderson and Renault (2006)), these signals can be interpreted as
information about characteristics of a product. The more information consumers have, the
better they know about their (private) match values for this product. In other words, we

13
focus on the aspect where the intermediary provides “horizontal information” rather than
“vertical information” such as product quality; while consumers choose between buying or
not, rather than which product to buy. Consequently, our model abstracts from paid sponsorship, a business model sometimes used by intermediaries, especially influencers, where
sellers pay intermediaries for them to promote their products. Instead, we only consider the
information-provision service of intermediaries.
Revenue sharing rule—The seller and the intermediary are assumed to share total sales
revenue in each period through an exogenous and constant sharing rule α ∈ (0, 1). This
reflects a feature of the market of informational intermediary that it is sometimes difficult to
contingent prices of intermediaries’ services on their prominence, due to either legal, technical,
or institutional reasons.11 In Section 7, we extend our model and show that there would still
be unintended welfare losses even if the sharing rule (under parametric assumptions) depends
on the intermediary’s prominence level
Market evolution—The market sizes {mt } is assumed to evolve through an exogenously
given law of motion, with a growth rate that depends linearly on the consumer surplus
in the same period. The linearity assumption is mostly for the ease of exposition, as it
admits a closed-form solution for the intermediary’s problem when taking her continuation
value as given. In Section 7, we relax this assumption and consider more general mappings
from consumer surplus to growth rates. In contrast, the exogenous law of motion is a more
consequential assumption, as it abstracts from strategic decisions of consumers in terms of
entry and exit. In Section 7, we introduce a specific micro foundation for this exogenous law
of motion, where consumers are short-lived but some of them can decide whether they would
exit and obtain their (heterogeneous) outside options.
Effects of higher market feedback—Under our assumptions, higher market feedback
level β has three effects: (i) it leads to a more market-minded intermediary who assigns more
weights to consumer surplus; (ii) it leads to higher market growth rate; and (iii) it may change
the equilibrium strategies. It is noteworthy that effect (i) is always (weakly) beneficial for
consumers, while effect (ii) is always (weakly) beneficial for every players. Nonetheless, our
main result suggests that higher β may lead to Pareto worse outcomes despite the positive
effects of (i) and (ii). In other words, the essence of our main results is effect (iii) could
possibly dominate (i) and (ii).
11

For example, it would be difficult for product sellers to contingent their commission rates for financial and
insurance brokers, since their prominence level may be difficult to measure. Alternatively, influencers retain
commissions through third party affiliate links (e.g., rStyle or ShopStyle) and hence the commission rates for
influencers mostly remain the same for similar products regardless of how many followers an influencer has.
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4

Markov Perfect Equilibrium and Unintended Welfare Loss

In this section, we characterize all Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes and show that higher
market feedback might lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes. To this end, we first establish
formally the criterion we use for such comparisons. Given any strategy profile, we refer to
the sequence of normalized sales revenues (i.e., sales revenue divided by the market size),
normalized consumer surpluses, the intermediary’s normalized continuation payoffs, prices,
and market sizes in each period as an outcome, which we denote by z := {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt }.
Definition 1. For any two outcomes z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt } and z0 = {rt0 , σt0 , ωt0 , p0t , m0t }, say
that z0 is dominated by z (denoted as z  z0 ) if for all t, m0t rt0 ≤ mt rt , m0t σt0 ≤ mt σt and
m0t ωt0 ≤ mt ωt , with at least one inequality being strict.
Moreover, when restricting to Markov perfect equilibria, as players’ strategies do not
depend on histories in previous periods, in any Markov perfect equilibrium outcome, only
the market sizes would depend on t. As a result, we may suppress the unnecessary subscripts
and write a Markov perfect equilibrium outcome as zM = (rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }).
4.1

Finite Markov Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes

In what follows, we first focus on finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes. We characterize
all finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes and compare them by varying market feedback
β. Let p be the unique solution of maxp pD(p), and let
β :=

1 − γδ
δE[v]

and

β :=

1 − γδ
R∞
.
δ p D(v) dv

Below we first state our main welfare result.
Proposition 1 (Unintended Welfare Loss—Finite Markov). For any β < β, there exists a
unique finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome zM (β). Furthermore, zM (β)  zM (β 0 ) for
all β, β 0 such that β < β < β 0 < β.
According to Proposition 1, higher market feedback does not necessarily benefit the consumers, even if it compels the intermediary to be concerned more about consumer surplus.
In fact, higher market feedback might even lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. Whenever
β ∈ (β, β), an increase in market feedback would lead to unintended welfare loss by yielding
Pareto inferior finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1 is established by characterizing all the finite Markov perfect equilibrium
outcomes. We begin the analysis by noting that even though payoffs could potentially be
unbounded, the one-shot deviation principle would still hold when considering strategy profiles that yield a finite continuation payoff for the intermediary at every history. This is
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because stage game payoffs are bounded from below and because the intermediary’s payoff
is additively separable. Lemma 1 below summarizes this observation.
Lemma 1 (One-Shot Deviation Principle). Given any strategies of the seller and the tiebreaker, for any history ht in any period t, and for any strategy of the intermediary that yields
a finite continuation payoff, there is a profitable deviation from the continuation strategy at
ht if and only if there is a profitable one-shot deviation at some history after ht .
We now outline the characterization of finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes. To
begin with, notice that with Lemma 1, Markov perfect equilibria can be characterized by the
incentives of both the intermediary and the (short-lived) seller in each period while holding
each other’s strategy fixed. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. A finite Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized by a tuple (ω M , pM , DM ) with
ω M , pM ∈ [0, ∞) and DM : R+ → D that satisfy the following conditions:



Z ∞
M
M
M
M
ω = sup αp D(p ) + δω
γ+β
D(v) dv ,
(4)
D∈D

pM

pM DM (pM |pM ) ≥ pDM (p|p),

(5)

for all p ≥ 0,

Z
αpD (p|p) + δω
γ+β
M

M

p

∞
M

D (v|p) dv




Z
≥ αpD(p) + δω
γ+β
M

∞


D(v) dv ,

(6)

p

for all p ≥ 0 and for all D ∈ D. Furthermore, for any Markov perfect equilibrium (ω M , pM , DM ),
R∞ M
M
M M M M
M
its outcome is given by (rM , pM , σ M , ω M , {mM
}),
where
r
=
p
D
(p
|p
),
σ
=
D (v|pM ) dv,
t
pM
M t
and mM
t = (γ + βσ ) for all t ≥ 0.
One of the implications of this characterization is that the tie-breaker always breaks tie
to maximize sales revenue in each period, and thus it would not be necessary to keep track
of the tie-breaker’s strategy when restricting to finite Markov perfect equilibria.
Using Lemma 2, characterizing finite Markov perfect equilibria becomes essentially a
static problem that consists of: (i) solving for the intermediary’s per-period best response,
given a price p posted by the seller in that period and given its continuation value (solving
(6) given p, ω M ); (ii) solving for the seller’s best response given (i) (solving (5) given ω M and
the intermediary’s best response derived in (i)); and (iii) finding a consistent continuation
payoff (verifying (4) given (i) and (ii)). We now introduce two lemmas that characterize the
solutions of steps (i) and (ii) for a fixed continuation value.
For any p ≥ 0, let v(p) := E[v|v ≥ p] and let v −1 (p) := inf{x ≥ 0|v(x) ≥ p}.12 Notice
that both v and v −1 are nondecreasing and v −1 (p) = 0 for all p ∈ [0, E[v]].
12

As a convention, if p is greater than the upper bound of the support of D, define E[v|v ≥ p] as this upper
bound. Meanwhile, if p is greater than maxx≥0 v(x), then define v −1 (p) as maxx≥0 v(x).
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R∞
x

R∞

D(v) dv

0

x

v −1 (p)

p

(a) Optimal cutoff = v −1 (p)

D(v) dv

x

x

ξ(p|ω) p

0

(b) Optimal Cutoff = ξ(p|ω)

Lemma 3. For any p, ω ∈ [0, ∞),


Z
∆(p|ω) := argmax αpD(p) + δω γ + β
D∈D

∞


D(v) dv

p

is nonempty. Moreover, for any D ∈ ∆(p|ω), D(v) = D(ξ(p|ω)), for all v ∈ [ξ(p|ω), p] and
Z ∞
Z ∞
D(v) dv =
D(v) dv,
ξ(p|ω)

where

ξ(p|ω)

(
)
+
α
ξ(p|ω) := max
p, v −1 (p) .
1−
δβω

Lemma 3 provides a characterization of the intermediary’s optimal disclosure policy given
a price p and a continuation value ω. For any p, ω ∈ [0, ∞), the intermediary essentially faces
a static problem where she chooses a demand D ∈ D to maximizes a linear combination of
the sales revenue and consumer surplus.
To gain some intuitions, consider first the case when β = 0 so that the intermediary
seeks to maximize sales revenue, which is equivalent to maximizing sales volume for each
given price. In this case, for any price p ∈ [0, E[v]], the intermediary can simply disclose no
information and every consumer would buy. Meanwhile, if p ∈ (E[v], ∞), then the largest
possible trade volume can be attained if every consumer with values above a threshold buys
and if their interim expected value equals to p, which in turn implies that the threshold is
v −1 (p) (see Figure 2a). Notice that in both cases, consumer surplus equals to zero. Now
suppose that β > 0, then the intermediary would benefit from leaving the consumers some
surplus. This means that she may rather induce fewer consumers to buy in order to prevent
low-value consumers from buying at a high price. As a result, the intermediary would prefer
inducing a higher threshold, which is precisely given by ξ(p|β) (see Figure 2b).
For any ω ∈ [0, ∞), anticipating the intermediary’s best response, the seller effectively
solves a revenue maximization with the demand at price p being the sales volume induced by
the intermediary’s best response against price p. Lemma 4 below characterizes the solution
of this problem.
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pD(ξ(p|ω))

pD(ξ(p|ω))

p̃D(v −1 (p̃))
p̃D



1−

α
δβω

 
p̃

p
0

p
0

p̃

(a) First Inequality of (7) Binds

p̃

(b) Second Inequality of (7) Binds

Figure 3: Optimal Price p̃
Lemma 4. For any ω ∈ [0, ∞) and for any selection D of ∆(·|ω), the maximization problem
max pD(p|p)
p≥0

has a unique solution p̃. Furthermore,
−1

v (p̃) ≤



α
1−
δβω

+
p̃ ≤ p,

(7)

with at least one inequality binding. In particular,

+
Z ∞
α
p̃ = v −1 (p̃).
D(v|p̃) dv = 0 ⇐⇒ 1 −
δβω
p̃
To better understand Lemma 4, notice that by Lemma 3, pD(p|p) = pD(ξ(p|ω)) for any
p, ω ∈ [0, ∞) and for any selection D of ∆(·|ω). As a result, the seller’s revenue maximization
problem can be written as
"
(
)#
+ !

α
p
, pD(v −1 (p))
max pD(ξ(p|ω)) = max min pD
.
1−
p≥0
p≥0
δβω
Clearly, if δβω ≤ α, then the function above would coincide with pD(v −1 (p)) and the optimal price must be E[v] and the first inequality of (7) binds and consumer surplus is zero.
Meanwhile, if δβω > α, then there are two possibilities, as depicted by Figure 3. The first
possibility is as illustrated by Figure 3a, where the optimal price is the price at which the
graph of the two functions intersect. In this case, the first inequality of (7) binds and the
consumer surplus is zero. Another possibility is illustrated by Figure 3b. In this case, the
optimal price is at which the first function is maximized. In this case, the second inequality
of (7) binds and the consumer surplus is positive.
Even with a fixed ω, Lemma 4 already highlights the main driving force behind Proposition 1. Indeed, when β is close enough to zero (i.e., when δβω ≤ α), the induced sales
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revenue is E[v] and the allocation is efficient. As β increases, the optimal price would first
increase while the consumer surplus would remain zero. This means that the sales revenue
would decrease, consumers would not be benefited and the market sizes would remain the
same as the case of lower β, leading to a Pareto-inferior outcome. Only when β is large
enough will consumer surplus become positive and will the price begin to decrease. The
intuition behind this feature is reminiscent of the hold-up problem logic: Since the intermediary discloses information after observing the seller’s price, and since the intermediary seeks
to enhance consumer surplus in addition to the sales revenue, the seller—in the anticipation
of the intermediary’s response—would charge a higher price to suppress the intermediary’s
urge of improving consumer surplus so that her interest could be more well-aligned with the
seller’s. This in turn leads to Pareto inferior outcomes
The above reasoning holds for any given continuation value ω. To complete proof of
Proposition 1, we need to characterize the equilibrium continuation value. With Lemma 3
and Lemma 4, finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes can be completely characterized. Indeed, given Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 characterizes the solution of the seller’s revenue
maximization problem given ω, it remains to find the proper continuation value ω M and equilibrium price pM that satisfies (4), (5) and (6). To describe finite Markov perfect equilibrium
outcomes, it is convenient to define
!
pD(p)
α
,
1+ R∞
g β (p) :=
δβ
D(v) dv
p
for all p ∈ [0, p]. Notice that the function (β, p) 7→ g β (p) is continuous, strictly decreasing in
β, and strictly increasing in p on [0, p]. Meanwhile, let




Z ∞
β
p := inf p ≥ 0 δ γ + β
D(v) dv ≥ 1 .
p

By definition, pβ ∈ (0, p) whenever β ∈ (β, β). Moreover, pβ is strictly decreasing in β on
[β, β]. With this notation, finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes can be characterized
by Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1 (Finite Markov Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes). A finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome exists if and only if β ∈ [0, β]. Furthermore, the following are equivalent:
1. zM = (rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }) is a finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome.
2. ω M ≥ g β (p) if β = β, while
(
ω

M

=

αE[v]
,
1−γδ
β β

if β ∈ [0, β]
.
g (p ), if β ∈ (β, β)
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r
E[v]
(1−γδ)g β (p)
α

pD(p)

σ
R∞
p

D(v) dv

Figure 4: Surplus Divisions under Finite Markov Perfect Equilibria
Moreover,






E[v],
if β ∈ [0, β]
E[v],
if β ∈ [0, β]

(1−γδ) β β
M
M
β
p =
v(p ), if β ∈ (β, β) ; r =
g (p ), if β ∈ (β, β) ;
α


 δβωM
 δβωM
p,
if β = β
pD(p),
if β = β
δβω M −α
δβω M −α
(
0,
if β ∈ [0, β)
σM = R ∞
;
α
D(v) dv − δβωM −α pD(p),
if β = β
p
M t
and mM
t = (γ + βσ ) , for all t ≥ 1.

With Theorem 1, Proposition 1 then follows immediately. Figure 4 plots the set of
normalized surplus divisions induced by finite Markov perfect equilibria across all β ∈ [0, β].
For any β ∈ [0, β], the sales revenue equals to E[v] and consumer surplus is zero. For any
β ∈ (β, β), the sales revenue equals to (1 − γδ)g β (pβ )/α and consumer surplus remains
zero. In particular, sales revenue decreases as β increases. Finally, when β = β, there are
multiple finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes and every such outcome induces a total
surplus of (1 − γδ)g β (p)/α. Specifically, when β ∈ (β, β), higher market feedback leads to
Pareto inferior outcomes. Moreover, even if consumer surplus can be positive when β = β,
the induced total surplus must lower than those induced by any β < β. For comparison,
Figure 4 also plots the set of possible surplus division under the same D that can arise under
any consumer information (see Roesler and Szentes (2017)) when the seller prices after seeing
the information structure, which corresponds to the area bounded by the dashed lines.
4.2

Infinite Markov Perfect Equilibria

The previous section restricts attention to finite Markov perfect equilibria outcomes. Compared with infinite Markov perfect equilibria, finite Markov perfect equilibria are arguably
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more selective and natural since the intermediary would be indifferent among many choices—
especially off the equilibrium path—when the present discounted profit diverges, which in
turn allows the intermediary to punish the seller’s deviation severely. Nonetheless, understanding infinite Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes may further complete the characterization. In what follows, we further characterize all infinite Markov perfect equilibrium
outcomes.
Since the market grows at a rate that is increasing in β for any fixed level of consumer
surplus, the intermediary’s present discounted profit may diverge in principle, even if there
is discount. As noted above, when allowing for divergent payoffs, the intermediary would
be indifferent among many different disclosure policies in a given period, as long as the
continuation payoff diverges. This in turn allows the intermediary to punish the seller’s deviation more severely, and thus there are generally many infinite Markov equilibrium outcomes.
Nevertheless, even when considering infinite Markov perfect equilibria as well, the welfare
implication of Proposition 1 still remains the same qualitatively.
To summarize this, we first let
r∗ := sup inf

inf

p≥0 D∈D q∈[D(p+ ),D(p)]

p·q

(8)

denote the revenue guarantee. That is, r∗ is the sales revenue that the seller can secure in each
period, regardless of the strategies of the intermediary and the tie-breaker. By definition, for
any r < r∗ , there exists p ≥ 0 such that for any D ∈ D, pD(p+ ) > r.
Notice that for any p ≥ E[v], inf D∈D pD(p+ ) = 0 since the demand D ∈ D that has a
jump of 1 at E[v] gives pD(p+ ) = 0. Meanwhile, for any p ∈ [0, E[v]), there exists a unique
ζ(p) ≥ p such that E[v|v ≤ ζ(p)] = p. It then follows that inf D∈D pD(p+ ) = pD(ζ(p)) (see
Figure 5).13 Therefore, we must have
r∗ = max pD(ζ(p)).
p∈[0,E[v]]

Now let
βe :=

1 − γδ
,
δ(E[v] − r∗ )

and note that β < βe < β. We then have the following.
e there
Proposition 2 (Unintended Welfare Loss–Markov Perfect Equilibria). For any β < β,
exists a unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome zM (β) and any Markov perfect equilibrium
that induces outcome zM (β) must be finite. Furthermore, zM (β)  zM (β 0 ) for all β, β 0 such
e
that β < β < β 0 < β.
13

The function p 7→ pD(ζ(p)) is equivalent to the “pressed” D introduced by Libgober and Mu (2021).

21
R∞
x

D(v) dv

E[v]

0

p

x
ζ(p)

Figure 5: Minimizing Revenue Given p
The welfare implication of Proposition 2 is essentially the same as that of Proposition 1.
The only differences are (i) the upper bound below which a unique Markov perfect equilibrium
outcomes exists becomes lower when infinite Markov perfect equilibria are allowed, and (ii)
the range of market feedback where unintended welfare loss is caused by higher market
feedback becomes smaller.
Similar to Proposition 1, we prove Proposition 2 by characterizing every infinite Markov
perfect equilibria. To state this characterization, for any q ∈ [0, 1], define
Z q
−1
S(q) :=
D (z) dz.
0

R∞
Note that S(D(p)) = pD(p) + p D(v) dv is the sum of consumer surplus and sales revenue
when the price is p and when the demand is D. With this additional notation, we can now
state the characterization.
Theorem 2 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes). For any β ≥ 0, an infinite Markov
e Moreover, for any Markov perfect equilibrium
perfect equilibrium exists if and only if β ≥ β.
outcome zM = (rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }), exactly one of the following is true.
1. zM is a finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome.
2. ω M = ∞,
1 − γδ
≤σ M ≤ E[v] − r∗
δβ
rM
E[v] − σ M ≤pM ≤ −1 M
,
S (r + σ M )

max S(D(ζ(E[v] − σ M ))) − σ M , r∗ ≤rM ≤ E[v] − σ M
M t
and mM
t = (γ + βσ ) for all t ≥ 1.
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5

Equilibrium Payoff Set and the Efficiency Lower Bound

In this section, we move beyond Markov perfect equilibria and characterize the set of payoffs
that can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Due to the infinitely repeated
nature, there are inevitably many subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. The results in
this section characterize these outcomes, which in turn lead to another version of unintended
welfare loss. Indeed, as shown below, whenever β ≤ β, there exists a unique Pareto-worst
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Moreover, this worst outcome becomes Pareto inferior
as β increases.
To state the results, first recall that r∗ denotes the revenue guarantee defined in (8).
Furthermore, since the function p 7→ pD(v −1 (p)) is quasi-concave, there exists a unique
p∗ ≥ E[v] such that r∗ = p∗ D(v −1 (p∗ )). In other words, when the seller charges a price
p∗ and when the intermediary chooses her myopic best response given p∗ , the sales revenue
would be exactly r∗ . Consequently, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the seller would
not charge any price p > p∗ , since the best revenue given that price is below the revenue
guarantee r∗ .14 With the definition of r∗ and p∗ , define
ω ∗ :=

αp∗ D(v −1 (p∗ ))
αr∗
=
,
1 − γδ
1 − γδ

and notice that ω ∗ is the present discounted profit of the intermediary if the market growth
rate is γ (i.e., consumer surplus is zero) and the sales revenue equals to the revenue guarantee
in every period. Meanwhile, let p̂ be the unique price p ≤ p such that pD(p) = r∗ , define
βb :=

1 − γδ
R∞
δ p̂ D(v) dv

and

β ∗ :=

1 − γδ
R∞
δ p∗ D(v) dv

and notice that 0 < β < βe < βb < β < β ∗ .
In what follows, we will characterize the set of intermediary’s payoffs among all subgame
perfect equilibria. To begin with, we first identify a useful lower bound of the intermediary’s
equilibrium payoff. Clearly, since the sales revenue in every period is at least r∗ and since the
market growth rate is at least γ, the intermediary’s payoff must be at least ω ∗ . Moreover, if the
seller prices at p∗ in every period and the intermediary chooses the myopic best response, then
the payoff ω ∗ can be attained. However, it is not always incentive compatible for the seller
and the intermediary to adopt these strategies. In particular, even when the intermediary
anticipates that the seller will always post p∗ and that the normalized continuation value will
always be ω ∗ , it may not be optimal for the intermediary to choose the myopic best response
and maximize sales revenue when the market feedback is large enough. To take this into
account, we construct a tighter lower bound and accounts for the aforementioned incentive.
In fact, p∗ plays the role as the min-max strategy does in canonical repeated games with perfect monitoring, and coincides with the min-max strategy in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990).
14
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Let
Z
h(ω) := δ γ + β

!

∞
+

α
(1− δβω
)

D(v) dv ω,
p∗

for all ω ≥ 0, and let
ω := inf{ω ≥ ω ∗ |h(ω 0 ) ≤ 1, ∀ω 0 ≥ ω}.
Notice that ω = ω ∗ whenever β ≤ β, and that ω → ∞ as β ↑ β ∗ .
Lemma 5. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, the intermediary’s payoff is at least ω.
Similar to Section 4, we first characterize the finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
(i.e., subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes where the intermediary’s continuation value is
finite in every subgame). For any β ≥ 0, let Ωf (β) denote the set of intermediary’s payoffs
among all finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 3 (Finite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs). A finite subgame perfect equilibrium exists if and only if β < β ∗ . Furthermore, for any β ∈ [0, β ∗ ),
Ωf (β) = [ω f (β), ω f (β)]\{∞},
for some ω ≤ ω f (β) ≤ ω f (β) ≤ ∞. Moreover, ω f is nonincreasing on [0, β] and ω f is
b β ∗ ); and
nondecreasing on [0, β ∗ ); while ω f (β) = ω whenever β ∈ [β,
(
αE[v]
, if β ∈ [0, β]
f
1−γδ
ω (β) =
.
b β ∗)
∞, if β ∈ [β,
As a remark, Theorem 3 characterizes the long run player’s equilibrium payoff for every
fixed discount δ ∈ (0, 1), rather than only characterizing these payoffs as δ approaches to
one as in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990). Furthermore, the characterization does
not involve fixed-point arguments and the notion of self-generating as in Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1986) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990).15 Instead, the bounds ω f (β)
and ω f (β) are simply determined by the value of a constrained optimization problem.
In addition to characterizing the intermediary’s equilibrium payoff, it would also be useful
to explore the sales revenue, consumer surplus, and prices that may occur in any period
under a finite subgame perfect equilibrium. After all, knowing how consumer surplus and
sales revenue are structured in a subgame perfect equilibrium could provide further welfare
implications. To this end, for any β ≥ 0, let
(
(1−γδ)ω f (β)
b
, if β ≤ β.
α
r(β) :=
r∗ ,
if β > βb
15

The reason is that—in addition to perfect monitoring—the intermediary and the seller’s stage game
payoffs are linearly dependent, so that feasible payoffs in a stage game is a line segment. As a result,
characterizing the intermediary’s equilibrium payoff is essentially equivalent to finding two endpoints.
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and define the set Zf (β) as follows:
 

r
+

(E[v]
−
p)
≤
σ
≤
S
−r

p

Zf (β) := (r, σ, p) ∈ R3+
r(β)
h ≤r≤p 

i

R∞


αr + δ(γ + βσ)ω f (β) ≥ sup
αpD(p) + δ γ + β
D(v) dv ω f (β)
D∈D

p

Using Theorem 3, finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be characterized, and is
given by Corollary 1
Corollary 1 (Finite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes). For any β ≥ 0 and for any
finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcome z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt }, (rt , σt , pt ) ∈ Zf (β) for all
t ∈ N. Furthermore, for any β ≥ 0, for any T ∈ N, and for any (r, σ, p) ∈ Zf (β), there exists
a finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcome z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt } such that rT = r, σT = σ,
and pT = p.
An immediate consequence of Corollary 1 is that any outcome z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt } in
which rt = r(β), σt = 0, and ωt = ω f (β) for all t is dominated by any other equilibrium
outcomes. In fact, whenever β ≤ β, such an equilibrium outcome always exists. In this
−1
equilibrium, the seller always charges a price p ∈ [E[v], p∗ ] so that pD (v −1 (p)) = r(β),
and the intermediary always chooses her myopic best response, which leads to zero consumer
surplus in each period. In the event of any deviation from the seller, the intermediary chooses
a disclosure policy to minimize revenue and the tie-breaker breaker breaks tie against the
seller. If the intermediary follows this punishment, then the continuation play gives an
equilibrium payoff of ω f (β); otherwise the continuation play gives the intermediary payoff
ω f (β).16
As a result, whenever β ≤ β, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome that
is dominated by every other subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, since ω is
nonincreasing in β, this dominated outcome becomes Pareto-inferior as β increases.
Proposition 3 (Unintended Welfare Loss—Finite Subgame Perfect). For any β ∈ [0, β],
there exists a finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcome z∗ (β) that is dominated by any other
finite subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, for any γ, δ such that γδ ≤ 1/2,
b δ) ∈ (0, β)
b such that for any 0 < β < β 0 < β(γ,
b δ), z∗ (β)  z∗ (β 0 ).
there exists β(γ,
It is noteworthy that the worst subgame perfect equilibrium outcome z∗ (β) introduced
by Proposition 3 is not Markov. In essence, z∗ (β) is obtained by constructing an equilibrium
that incentivizes the seller to post a high price, under which the intermediary’s best response,
when anticipating the seller posting the same high price in the future, is to maximize the
By the definition of ω f (β) and ω f (β) (which can be found in the online appendix), this makes the
intermediary’s punishment incentive compatible.
16
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current sales revenue and leave zero surplus to consumers. To properly incentivize the seller,
the intermediary punishes the seller’s deviation by minimizing sales revenue. For such punishments to be incentive compatible for the intermediary, the reward for carrying out the
punishment has to be large enough. Higher market feedback β allows the market to grow
faster and hence allows for higher continuation payoff for rewarding. As a result, when β
is higher, more severe punishments can be supported and hence more extreme price can be
incentivized.
We conclude this section by discussing subgame perfect equilibria where the intermediary’s payoff may be infinite in some subgames. From Theorem 2, it follows immediately that
e In fact, the converse is also
an infinite subgame perfect equilibrium exists whenever β ≥ β.
e When an infinite subgame
true: An infinite subgame perfect equilibrium exists only if β ≥ β.
perfect equilibrium exists, the intermediary can always be incentivized to use the most severe
punishment in the event of a deviation, and hence the seller can be incentivized to charge
any price in [r∗ , p∗ ]. As a result, any feasible payoff can be supported by a subgame perfect
equilibrium, as summarized below. To this end, for any β ≥ 0, let Ω(β) denote the set of
intermediary’s payoffs among all subgame perfect equilibria.
Theorem 4 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs). An infinite subgame perfect equilibrium
e Furthermore, for any β ≥ 0,
exists if and only if β ≥ β.
(
Ωf (β), if β < βe
.
Ω(β) =
[ω, ∞], if β ≥ βe
In the meantime, for any β ≥ 0, let Z(β) be defined as


Zf (β),
if β < βe

 (
)
r∗ ≤ r ≤ p  
Z(β) :=
.
3

(r, σ, p) ∈ R+
, if β ≥ βe

r
+

(E[v] − p) ≤ σ ≤ S p − r
Then the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as well.
Corollary 2 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes). For any β ≥ 0 and for any subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt }, (rt , σt , pt ) ∈ Z(β) for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, for any β ≥ 0, for any T ≥ 0, and for any (r, σ, p) ∈ Z(β), there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome z = {rt , σt , ωt , pt , mt } such that rT = r, σT = σ, and pT = p.
Together with Corollary 2, the implication of Proposition 3 can be extended even when
allowing for infinite subgame perfect equilibria, as summarized below.
Proposition 4 (Unintended Welfare Loss—Subgame Perfect). For any β ∈ [0, β], there
exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome z∗ (β) that is dominated by any other subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, for any γ, δ such that γδ ≤ 1/2, there exists
e δ) ∈ (0, β]
e such that for any 0 < β < β 0 < β(γ,
e δ), z∗ (β)  z∗ (β 0 ).
β(γ,
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6

Policy Implications: Countering the Unintended Welfare Loss

As demonstrated by Proposition 1 (as well as Proposition 3), higher level of market feedback
may lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. The underlying driving force of this result is the difference in interest between the seller and the intermediary. More specifically, Proposition 1
is driven by the fact that the intermediary would prefer the consumers to have larger surplus
and the seller to have higher revenue at the same time. As a result, as the level of market
feedback increases, the seller can raise the price to compel the intermediary to provide information in a way that is more aligned with the seller’s interest. Based on this observation, we
now discuss several alternatives that could alleviate the problem of unintended welfare loss:
subscription-based model, capping the market growth, and long-lived seller.
One of these alternatives involves a different business model for the intermediary. Specifically, instead of sharing the sales revenue with the seller, the intermediary’s source of revenue
can be derived from the consumers. Under the subscription-based business model, by either
collecting subscription fees from consumers directly or monetizing one’s digital account, the
intermediary’s profit becomes independent of the seller’s sales revenue—and in particular,
seller’s posted price. This in turn implies that the seller cannot affect the intermediary’s
disclosure policy using his posted price. In fact, as shown below, outcomes are always more
efficient when the market feedback level is higher.
Another alternative pertains to controlling the level of market feedback by imposing a cap
on the market growth rate.17 By capping the market growth rate, the difference of interest
between the intermediary and the seller can be further controlled. As shown below, under
proper caps, higher market feedback level would not lead to Pareto-worse outcomes and
would generate strictly higher total surplus in the economy than what is achieved without a
cap.
The third alternative seeks to eliminate the difference in interest by establishing a longterm relationship between the seller and the intermediary. After all, the difference in interest
is created by the feature that the seller does not internalize the benefit of market growth at
the time of setting the price. By establishing a long-term relationship with the intermediary
(i.e., by considering a long-lived seller), as shown below, higher market feedback would never
lead to less efficient outcomes.
6.1

Subscription-Based Model

In this section, we consider an alternative business model. In each period t ≥ 0, the timing
and the strategies remain the same: The seller posts a price pt , the intermediary sees pt and
17

In digital markets, this can be achieved by properly designing the recommendation algorithms so that
an intermediary cannot be targeted to too many consumers in a short period of time.
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chooses a disclosure policy Dt ∈ D, and the tie-breaker sees pt and Dt and chooses a tiebreaking rule qt ∈ [Dt (p+
t ), Dt (pt )]. However, instead of sharing with the intermediary, the
seller captures all the sale revenue mt · pt · qt in each period. The intermediary, on the other
hand, receives α
e ∈ [0, 1] share of the consumer surplus in each period. The interpretation is
that upon arrival, consumers pay a share α
e of their ex-ante surplus to the intermediary in
exchange of the intermediary’s information.
In essence, the subscription-based model decouples the seller’s and the intermediary’s
interests. Rather than seeking to raise sales revenue while keeping consumers surplus high
enough to sustain future revenue, the intermediary’s only goal in the subscription-based
model is to maximize consumer surplus, as both her stage game payoff and the market size
depend only on consumers’ average surplus. This further leads to a way to circumvent the
unintended welfare loss.
Proposition 5 (Subscription-Based Model). A Markov perfect equilibrium always exists.
For any β < β, there exists a unique finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome yM (β).
Furthermore, for any 0 < β < β 0 , yM (β) ≺ yM (β 0 ).
Although it is clear from Proposition 1 and Proposition 5 that compared to the revenuesharing model, the subscription-based model can better translate higher level of market
feedback into more efficient outcomes, it is not clear that the intermediary would always
prefer the subscription based model. After all, while the consumers enjoy higher surplus,
and hence market sizes are large under subscription-based model, more surplus is extracted
from the consumers under the revenue-sharing model. As demonstrated by Proposition 6
below, it is possible that the intermediary would always prefer the revenue-sharing model,
even if it means that there would be unintended welfare loss.
To state this result, for any β < β, let ω M (β) denote the intermediary’s payoff in the
unique finite Markov perfect equilibrium under the revenue-sharing model; and let ρM (β)
denote the intermediary equilibrium in the unique finite Markov perfect equilibrium under
the subscription-based model.
Proposition 6. There exists β 0 ≥ 0 such that ω M (β) > ρM (β) for all β ∈ [0, β 0 ). Moreover,
β 0 > 0 if and only if
α
e
E[v]
< R∞
;
α
D(v) dv
p
and β 0 > β if and only if
α
e
E[v]
+1 < R∞
.
α
D(v) dv
p
From Proposition 6, an immediate implication is the possibility that the intermediary
would prefer the revenue-sharing model over the subscription-based model, even if the β falls
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in the range (β > β) where higher market feedback level leads to unintended welfare loss
under the revenue-sharing model. Consequently, while the subscription-based model may be
better in terms of translating higher market feedback into efficiency, the intermediary might
not be willing to adopt this model voluntarily. Hence, some third-party interventions (e.g.,
monetization by large platforms and prohibiting revenue sharing) would be necessary.
6.2

Capping the Market Growth

Besides interventions that aim to alter the intermediary’s business model, we can also avoid
the unintended welfare loss through policy instruments that affect the market feedback. In
this section, we consider an alternative setting in which regulators can impose a cap on the
market growth rate. In each period, the timing, the strategies, and the payoffs remain the
same. However, the growth rate of the market size in each period cannot exceed an upper
bound χ. As a result, the evolution of market sizes in period t ≥ 0 is


Z ∞
Dt (v) dv .
mt+1 = mt · min χ, γ + β
pt

Intuitively, with a cap on the market growth rate, market feedback is effectively zero once
the market growth rate reaches the cap χ and the intermediary therefore has no incentive
to further raise the consumer surplus. Hence, a cap on the market growth rate limits the
extent to which the intermediary cares about consumer surplus and aligns the intermediary’s
interests with the seller’s. As the cap on market growth rate gets tighter, the intermediary’s
interests get better aligned with the seller’s. This leads to another way to circumvent the
unintended welfare loss.
Proposition 7. For any β ≥ 0, there exist χ > γ such that for any χ ∈ (γ, χ), there is a
unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome xM (β; χ) and mt = χt in equilibrium.
For each β ≥ 0, let χβ denote the supremum of the set of χ for which the statement in
Proposition 7 is valid. For χ ∈ (γ, χβ ), let StM (β; χ) denote the total surplus (the sum of
the seller’s, the intermediary’s, and the consumers’ payoffs) in period t under xM (β; χ). Let
StM (β; ∞) denote the total surplus in period t under the equilibrium outcome zM (β) in the
baseline model without a cap on market growth.
Proposition 8. (Capping the Market Growth) For any β < β1 < β2 < β and any χ ∈
(γ, min{χβ1 , χβ2 }),
1. xM (β1 ; χ)  xM (β2 ; χ).
2. StM (β1 ; χ) = StM (β2 ; χ) = χt E(v) > StM (β1 ; ∞) > StM (β2 ; ∞).
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As demonstrated in Proposition 8, a cap on the market growth rate can ensure that higher
market feedback does not lead to an unintended Pareto-worse outcome and can generate a
total surplus in each period strictly higher than the total surplus when there is no cap on
market growth. Intuitively, the intermediary has lower commission fee per unit of sales and
cares more about generating market growth when the price is lower. Therefore, the cap on the
growth rate only binds at lower prices, in which case the intermediary’s interests get aligned
to the seller’s. Anticipating this, the seller lowers the price and induces more consumers to
purchase the product. In equilibrium, all gains from trade are realised and the market size
grows faster, both of which contributes to a higher total surplus.
Besides raising the total surplus, a cap on the market growth rate can also lead to Pareto
improvements in the long run if there is non-negative exogenous growth (γ > 1). To state
M
M
M
the result, let xM
t (β, χ) and zt (β) denote the period-t outcomes under x (β, χ) and z (β)
respectively. Period-t outcomes can also be Pareto-ranked according to Definition 1.
Proposition 9. Suppose that γ > 1. For any β ∈ (β, β), there exists χ > γ and t > 0 such
M
that xM
t (β; χ)  zt (β) for χ ∈ (γ, χ) and t > t.
Even though a cap on the market growth rate that is tight enough can circumvent the
unintended welfare loss, generate additional surplus, and make all market participants better
off in the long run when γ > 1, restricting market growth too much would lead to a slow
market growth and reduced surplus in the market, as shown in Proposition 8.
Proposition 10. For any β > β, StM (β; ·) is strictly increasing on (γ, χβ ).
Consequently, policy makers should carefully choose the imposed cap on the market
growth rate to ensure that it is below the threshold χβ but not too much lower.
6.3

Long-Lived Seller

We now consider an alternate model where the seller is long-lived. The seller being longlived can be interpreted as establishing a long-term relationship between the seller and the
intermediary, which allows the seller to share the benefit of market growth and thus be
market-minded as well. Specifically, suppose that the seller is long-lived and that both the
seller and the intermediary have discount δ ∈ (0, 1). The timing and strategies of all players
remain the same: In each period t, the seller observes all past histories and then chooses a
price pt ; the intermediary then sees all past histories and pt before choosing a disclosure policy
Dt ∈ D; the tie-breaker then sees all past histories, pt and Dt and chooses a tie breaking rule
qt ∈ [Dt (p+
t ), Dt (pt )]. Given any strategy profile, the seller’s payoff is
π = (1 − α)p0 q0 +

∞
X
t=1

Z
t 
Y
δ
γ+β

∞

t

s=0

ps


Ds (v) dv (1 − α)pt qt ,
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while the intermediary’s payoff is
ω = αp0 q0 +

∞
X
t=1

δ

t

t 
Y
s=0

Z

∞


Ds (v) dv αpt qt ,

γ+β
ps

where {pt , Dt , qt } are the actions chosen by the seller, the intermediary, and the tie-breaker
on path, respectively. As a result, the seller’s and the intermediary’s interests are perfectly
aligned in this alternate model. As demonstrated by Proposition 11 below, this prevents
unintended welfare losses as β increases.
Proposition 11 (Long-Lived Seller). A Markov perfect equilibrium always exists. A finite
Markov perfect equilibrium outcome exists if and only if β < β. Moreover, whenever β < β,
the Markov perfect equilibrium outcome is unique and is the same as that when the seller is
short-lived.
From Proposition 11, it then follows that when β ≤ β, then whether the seller and the
intermediary have a long-run relationship is irrelevant. The induced Markov perfect equilibrium outcome is the same. In contrast, when β > β, from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2,
unintended welfare loss is possible when the seller is short-lived. However, the finite Markov
perfect equilibria that lead to unintended welfare losses would not even exist if the seller is
long-lived. This suggests that a possible way to avoid unintended welfare losses is to encourage sellers and the intermediaries to form long-term relationships and to discourage sellers
from frequently switching intermediaries they collaborate with.

7
7.1

Extensions
Strategic Consumers

Throughout the paper, we have abstracted away consumers participation decisions and assumed an exogenous law of motion of the market size. In reality, consumers could decide
whether they would like to participate and become a potential customer of the intermediary.
A certain aspect of this feature can be incorporated into the baseline model, which we now
describe.
Consider the baseline model but suppose instead that the market size evolves as follows:
In every period t ≥ 1, a mass γ c mt−1 of captive consumers, and a mass β c mt−1 of shopping
consumers first arrive, for some γ c , β c ≥ 0. The captive consumers must remain as a potential
customer of the intermediary (and hence the seller) regardless, while the shopping consumers
have outside options that are uniformly distributed on [0, E[v]], and can decide whether to
leave the market. If st is the share of shopping consumers who decide not to leave, then the
market size in period t would be
mt = mt−1 (γ c + β c st ).
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In this alternate setting, it follows that if the seller, the intermediary, and the tie-breaker
play any Markov strategy profile in the baseline model with γ = γ c and β = β c /E[v], then
a best response for shopping consumers is to leave the market if and only if their outside
option is greater than their expected surplus induced by the strategy profile. Meanwhile,
when consumers follow this strategy, the market size evolution becomes


Z ∞
βc
c
Dt (v) dv
mt = mt−1 γ +
E[v] pt
for all t, where pt ≥ 0 and Dt ∈ D are the price and the disclosure policy chosen by the seller
and the intermediary on path under that strategy profile, respectively.
As a result, any Markov perfect equilibrium in the baseline model with γ = γ c and β =
β c /E[v] would correspond to an equilibrium in this alternate setting where some consumers
can choose to leave.18 Moreover, consumers’ strategies in this equilibrium is simple: they
leave if and only if their outside option is greater than the average surplus in the previous
period.
7.2

Nonlinear Growth Rate

In the baseline model, it is assumed that the market growth rate is linear in consumer surplus.
In practice, market growth rates could depend on consumer surplus in a non-linear manner.
In this section, we consider an extension that captures a broad class of non-linear market
growth. Specifically, in each period t ≥ 1, the growth rate of the market size mt+1 /mt can
be a nonlinear function of the consumer surplus in period t:

Z ∞
mt+1
Dt (v) dv .
=f
mt
pt
for some function f , which we refer to as the market growth function. In this section, assume
that the function p 7→ pD(p) is strictly concave. We now characterize the set of Markov
perfect equilibria in this alternative setting.
Let F be the collection of twice-differentiable, increasing, and concave functions on R+
with f (0) = γ, and let
F1 := {f ∈ F|f 0 (0) ∈ [0, β]}.
Furthermore, for any β ∈ (β, β) and for any η ≥ 0, let
F2 (β, η) := {f ∈ F|f 0 (0) = β, kf 00 k ≤ η}.
18

This also provides a foundation for the interpretation that market feedback is higher when competition
is more intense, as the intensity of competition among intermediaries can be captured by the parameter β c .
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Notice that for any β ∈ (β, β), F1 and F2 (β, η) are disjoint. Moreover, in comparison
to the baseline model where market growth rates are assumed to be an affine function of
S
consumer surplus, f ∈ β∈(β,β) F2 (β, 0) is equivalent to the case of β ∈ (β, β).
As shown in Proposition 12 below, even with nonlinear market growth rate, there may
be unintended welfare losses as the level of market feedback increases.
Proposition 12 (Unintended Welfare Loss—Nonlinear Growth). There exists a continuously
S
decreasing function h : (β, β) → R++ such that every f ∈ F1 ∪ [ β∈(β,β) F2 (β, h(β))] induces
a unique finite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome zM (f ). Furthermore, for any β, β 0 such
that β < β < β 0 < β, zM (f1 )  zM (f2 ) for all f1 ∈ F2 (β, h(β)) and f2 ∈ F2 (β 0 , h(β 0 )).
S
According to Proposition 12, for any growth function in the set β∈(β,β) F2 (β, h(β)), an
increase in the level of market feedback at the level of zero consumer surplus (i.e., f 0 (0))
would unambiguously lead to welfare loss. From this regard, the unintended welfare losses
are not exclusively implied by linearity of the market growth function. Rather, the linearity
assumption in the baseline model is largely for the ease of exposition. Moreover, according
to Proposition 12, except for the derivative at zero f 0 (0) and the second derivative kf 00 k,
behaviors of growths functions f ∈ F do not matter for our result. Instead, only the second
derivative kf 00 k needs to be disciplined as f 0 (0) increases (through the function h).
7.3

Non-Stationary Revenue-Sharing Rule

Thus far, it is assumed that the seller and the intermediary share sales revenues in each
period according to a fixed α ∈ (0, 1). It is, however, reasonable to expect non-constant
sharing rules in reality. After all, in a market consists of many intermediaries and many
sellers, intermediaries with different prominence levels may have different outside options,
and are in fact offering different products (since the mass of consumers that can be reached
would be different). In this section, we consider an extension where the sharing rule can
depend on the current market size m, so that the intermediary can obtain α(m) share of
the sales revenue when the market size is m. When the sharing rule depends on the market
size, the stage game is no longer stationary in general. As a result, Markov strategies may
depend on market sizes in general and hence the intermediary’s best response in each period
would be characterized by a recursive Bellman equation even when restricted attention to
finite Markov perfect equilibria. Nonetheless, as shown below, under certain parametrization
of the function α, our previous analyses can be readily extended.
In what follows, we assume that at any history where the market size is m ≥ 1, the
intermediary can retain α(m) := m−α share of the sales revenue, for some α ∈ (0, 1).19 With
19

Under this assumption, α is decreasing in m, which means that the intermediary’s per-consumer per-sale
commission is decreasing in its prominence. Although under a different model, the equilibrium prices for
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this assumption, under any strategy profile, for any t ≥ 0, notice that
m
e t+1 := mt+1 α(mt+1 ) = f (σt )mt α(mt ) =: f (σt )m
e t,
where f (σ) := (γ + βσ)α+1 for some γ ≥ 1 is and σt denotes the consumer surplus induced
by this strategy profile in period t. Note that f is an increasing and concave function and
hence we may simply replace {mt } by {m
e t } and apply the results in Section 7.2.
Thus, even if the revenue sharing rule between the seller and the intermediary is allowed
to be non-stationary (in particular, to depend on the current market size), for a certain range
of β there would still be unintended welfare loss as β increases.
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Conclusions

In this paper, we show the possibility of unintended welfare losses in a setting where a product
seller collaborates with an informational intermediary in a relatively short term and rewards
intermediary via revenue sharing. The underlying reason is the difference in interests arising
from the intermediary’s concern about her own prominence in the future, and hence is more
market-minded compared to the seller. Specifically, we show that for a range of market
feedback levels, under the unique Markov perfect equilibria, higher market feedback would
lead to Pareto worse outcomes—even if higher market feedback means that market would
grow faster and that the intermediary is more market-minded and has greater incentives to
enhance consumer surplus. Moreover, we show that these unintedned welfare losses may
still be present even if one looks across all subgame perfect equilibria, in the sense that
the Pareto-worst subgame perfect equilibrium becomes even worse as the market feedback
increases.
We then discuss the implications of our characterization and the aforementioned unintended welfare losses. Our results can serve as a cautionary tale for policy making, as
they highlight the possibility changes in the level of market feedback may have counterintuitive policy implications. Moreover, we propose several ways that could eliminate such
unintended welfare losses, including replacing the revenue-sharing business model with a
subscription-based model; imposing a cap on the market growth rate; and establishing a
long-term relationship between the seller and the intermediary.
Several directions appear naturally as future research questions. For example, while we
only focus on the revenue-sharing and information provision business model, informational
intermediaries often operate with multiple different models, including the pay-sponsorship
model. It would be valuable to understand how intermediaries and the market choose among
these models and what are the welfare implications. Alternatively, while our model only
intermediaries’ services exhibit a similar feature in Fainmesser and Galeotti (2021).
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considers horizontal information (e.g., product characteristics), vertical information (e.g.,
product quality) is sometimes also an crucial dimension of an intermediary’s services. Lastly,
from a design point of view, it would also be useful to better understand the broader impact
of rating systems and consumers’ communication network.
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Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of results in Section 4. Proofs for other results are either more technical or
about extensions, and thus are relegated to the online appendix.

A.1

Proof of Lemma 1

The “if” part immediately follows from the definition of strategies. For the “only if” part, it suffices to show
that there is a profitable deviation only if there is a finite-shot deviation. To this end, consider any period
t, any history ht , and any strategy profile that gives the intermediary a finite continuation payoff. Let σ|ht
denote the intermediary’s continuation strategy and let
ωt =

∞
X

δ s ms ps qs < ∞

s=t

denote the intermediary’s continuation payoff, where ps ≥ 0, Ds ∈ D and qs ∈ [Ds (p+
s ), Ds (ps )] are the price
charged by the seller, the disclosure policy adopted by the intermediary and the tie-breaking rule chosen by
the tie-breaker on path in each period s ≥ t, respectively, and {ms } are the induced market sizes on path.
Suppose that, when holding the seller’s and the tie-breaker’s strategies fixed, there is another continuation
strategy σ̃|ht at ht that gives the intermediary a continuation payoff
ω̃t =

∞
X

δ s m̃s p̃s q̃s > ωt ,

s=t

[D̃s (p̃+
s ), D̃s (p̃s )]

where p̃s ≥ 0, D̃s ∈ D, and q̃s ∈
are the price charged by the seller, the disclosure policy
adopted by the intermediary, and the tie-breaking rule chosen by the tie-breaker in each period s ≥ t
on the path induced by σ̃|ht , the seller’s strategy and the tie-breaker’s strategy, respectively, and {m̃s }
are the associated market sizes. Furthermore, for any T > t, let ω̃tT be the intermediary’s continuation
payoff at history ht when following σ̃|ht until period T > t and then return to σ|ht from period T onward.
Clearly, since stage game payoffs are bounded from below, both ω̃t and ω̃tT are well-defined. Moreover, for
x ∈ {ω̃t , ω̃tT }, either x = ∞ or x < ∞. Clearly, if lim supT →∞ ω̃tT = ∞, then since ωt < ∞, there exists T̂
such that ω̃tT̂ > ωt and hence deviating to σ̃|ht for T̂ periods then and return to σ|ht is profitable for the
intermediary. Thus, it is without loss to assume that lim supT →∞ ω̃tT < ∞. In the meantime, if ω̃t = ∞,
then there exists T̂ such that
T̂
X
δ s m̃s p̃s q̃s > ωt ,
s=t

ω̃tT̂

which in turn implies that
> ωt since stage game payoffs are nonnegative. Therefore, it is also without
loss to assume that ω̃t < ∞. Furthermore, since lim supT →∞ ω̃tT < ∞, {ω̃tT } is bounded. Thus, there exists
a convergent subsequence {ω̃tTn }. We claim that it must be
lim ω̃tTn ≥ ω̃t .

n→∞

Indeed, suppose the contrary, that limn→∞ ω̃tTn < ω̃t . For any n ∈ N, since ω̃tTn < ∞, it can be written as
ω̃tTn

=

Tn
X
s=t

s

δ m̃s p̃s q̃s +

∞
X
s=Tn +1

δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn ,

39
n n
where for any n ∈ N, p̃ns ≥ 0, D̃sn ∈ D and q̃sn ∈ [D̃sn (p̃n+
s ), D̃s (p̃s )] are the price charged by the seller, the
disclosure policies adopted by the intermediary, and the tie-breaking rule chosen by the tie-breaker in period
s ≥ Tn + 1 on path, respectively, and {m̃s }∞
s=Tn +1 are the associated market sizes. Hence, for any n ∈ N,

ω̃tTn

− ω̃t =

∞
X

δ

s

m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn

s=Tn +1

Therefore, since ω̃t < ∞, and since

P∞

s=Tn +1 δ

s m̃n p̃n q̃ n
s s s

∞
X

−

δ s m̃s p̃s q̃s .

s=Tn +1

≤ ω̃tTn for all n ∈ N,

0 > lim [ω̃tTn − ω̃t ]
n→∞
" ∞
#
∞
X
X
= lim
δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn −
δ s m̃s p̃s q̃s
n→∞

= lim

n→∞

= lim

n→∞

s=Tn +1
∞
X

s=Tn +1
∞
X

δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn − lim

s=Tn +1
∞
X

n→∞

δ s m̃s p̃s q̃s

s=Tn +1

δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn .

s=Tn +1

However, since stage game payoffs are nonnegative, δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N and for all s ≥ Tn + 1, which
implies that
∞
X
lim
δ s m̃ns p̃ns q̃sn ≥ 0,
n→∞

s=Tn +1

a contradiction. Thus, it must be that limn→∞ ω̃tTn ≥ ω̃t .
As a result, since ω̃t > ωt , there exists n ∈ N such that ω̃tTn > ωt , as desired.

A.2



Proof of Lemma 2

Consider any finite Markov perfect equilibrium. Since both the intermediary’s and the seller’s strategy do not
depend on past histories in any finite Markov perfect equilibrium, the intermediary’s normalized equilibrium
continuation value in a given period must be a constant. Therefore, for any t, the intermediary’s normalized
continuation payoff at the beginning of period t can be written as ω M ∈ [0, ∞). Meanwhile, since the seller’s
strategy does not depend on history either, the price charged by the seller in period t must be a constant
pM ∈ [0, ∞) as well. Therefore, since both the intermediary and the seller are best responding in any finite
Markov perfect equilibrium at any history, (4), (5), and (6) must hold.
Conversely, given any tuple (ω M , pM , DM ) that satisfies the conditions required by the lemma, the
strategy profile where the seller chooses pM and the intermediary chooses DM (·|p) ∈ D whenever the seller
chooses posted price p ≥ 0 in the same period is immune to one-shot deviations. Moreover, since ω M < ∞,
Lemma 1 then implies that this strategy profile is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. This completes
the proof.
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A.3

Proof of Lemma 3

First, notice that for any D ∈ D,
Z

+

∞

Z

∞

D(v) dv ≤

(E[v] − p) ≤

D(v) dv
p

p

for all p ≥ 0. Moreover, notice that the function
Z ∞
D(v) dv − (p − ξ)D(ξ)
ξ 7→
ξ

is strictly decreasing on [0, p], with a value of 0 at ξ = v −1 (p) and a value of
must exist a unique ξ(p) ∈ [v −1 (p), p] such that
Z ∞
Z ∞
D(v) dv − (p − ξ)D(ξ) =
D(v) dv.

R∞
p

D(v) dv at ξ = p, there

p

ξ

b ∈ D such that
Now consider any D
∞

Z

∞

Z

D(v) dv

b
D(v)
dv =
ξ(p)

(A.9)

ξ(p)

and that
b
D(v)
= D(ξ(p)),

(A.10)

b exists since when D
b is defined as
for all v ∈ (ξ(p), p]. Such D


1,
if v ∈ [0, E[v|v ≤ ξ(p)]]

b
D(v) :=
D(ξ(p)), if v ∈ (E[v|v ≤ ξ(p)], E[v|v ≥ ξ(p)]] ,


0,
if v ∈ (E[v|v ≥ ξ(p)], ∞)
we have

Z

∞

Z

∞

b
D(v)
dv =
ξ(p)

D(v) dv.
ξ(p)

b satisfying (A.9) and (A.10), by definition of ξ(p),
As a result, for any D
Z ∞
Z ∞
b
D(v) dv =
D(v) dv.
p

p

Moreover, D ∈ D, (A.9) implies that
Z ∞
Z
0≤
(D(v) − D(v)) dv ≤
ξ(p)

p

(D(ξ(p)) − D(v)) dv ≤ (p − ξ(p))(D(ξ(p)) − D(p)),

ξ(p)

and hence D(p) ≤ D(ξ(p)). Together, we have


Z ∞
αpD(p) + δω γ + β
D(v) dv ≤ αpD(ξ(p)) + δω γ + β
p

Z

!!

∞

D(v) dv − (p − ξ(p))D(ξ(p))

.

ξ(p)

b satisfying (A.9) and (A.10),
Lastly, notice that for any D
Z

∞

!!
D(v) dv − (p − ξ(p))D(ξ(p))

αpD(ξ(p)) + δω γ + β
ξ(p)


Z
b
= αpD(p) + δω γ + β
p

∞


b
D(v) dv .
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b ∈ D satisfying (A.9) and (A.10) such that
As a result, for any D, there exists another D




Z ∞
Z ∞
b
b
αpD(p) + δω γ + β
D(v) dv ≤αpD(p)
+ δω γ + β
D(v)
dv
p

p

Z

!!

∞

D(v) dv − (p − ξ(p))D(ξ(p))

=αpD(ξ(p)) + δω γ + β

.

ξ(p)

Therefore, the maximization problem

Z
sup αpD(p) + δω γ + β
D∈D

∞


D(v) dv

p

can be simplified to
max

ξ∈[v −1 (p),p]


Z
αpD(ξ) + δω γ + β

∞


D(v) dv − (p − ξ)D(ξ)
,

(A.11)

ξ

which, by continuity of D, has a solution. This implies that ∆(p|ω) is nonempty. Moreover, the first-order
Kuhn-Tucker condition of (A.11) implies its solution ξ(p|ω) is given by
(
)

α +
p, v −1 (p) .
ξ(p|ω) = max
1−
δβω
b ∈ D satisfying the condition given by the lemma must be in ∆(p|ω). This
This in turn implies that any D
completes the proof.


A.4

Proof of Lemma 4

By Lemma 3, for any selection D of ∆(·|ω),
(
)!

α +
1−
pD(p|p) = pD(ξ(p|ω)) = pD max
p, v −1 (p)
δβω
(
)

 !
α +
−1
= min pD
1−
p , pD(v (p)) ,
δβω
where the last equality follows from the fact that D is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, notice that for any
p, if 1 ≤ α/δβω, then

 !
α +
pD
1−
p = p.
δβω
Meanwhile, if 1 > α/δβω, let p̃ := (1 − α/δβω)p, then
 !

α +
δβω
pD
1−
p =
p̃D(p̃).
δβω
δβω − α
Thus, since D is regular, p 7→ D((1 − α/δβω)p) is quasi-concave as well. Lastly, by the definition of v −1 the
function p 7→ D(v −1 (p)) is also quasi-concave. Together, the function
p 7→ pD(p|p)
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is quasi-concave since it is a minimum of two quasi-concave functions. Thus, maxp≥0 pD(p|p) has a unique
solution.
Moreover, if 1 ≤ α/δβω, then pD(p|p) = pD(v −1 (p)) and hence p̃ = E[v], which in turn implies that


α +
1−
p̃ = 0 = v −1 (p̃) ≤ p.
δβω
Meanwhile, if 1 > α/δβω, notice that the function p 7→ D(v −1 (p)) is maximized at p = E[v] and that
E[v]D(v −1 (E[v])) = E[v] ≥ E[v]D((1 − α/δβω)E[v]). As a result, since p 7→ pD(p|p) is quasi-concave and
hence single-peaked, it must attain its maximum at either price p such that pD(v −1 (p)) = pD((1−α/δβω)p)
or the maximizer of pD((1 − α/δβω)p), whichever is smaller. Together with the fact that the maximizer of
pD((1 − α/δβω)p) equals to
δβω
argmax
p̃D(p̃),
δβω − α
p̃
which is given by δβωp/(δβω − α), it then follows that either


α
δβω
1−
p̃ = v −1 (p̃) and p̃ ≤
p
δβω
δβω − α
or
p̃ =

δβω
p ≤ v(p).
δβω − α

As a result, it must be that
v

−1



α +
(p̃) ≤ 1 −
p̃ ≤ p,
δβω

with at least one inequality binding.
Lastly, suppose that
Z

∞

D(v|p̃) dv = 0.
p̃

Then, by Lemma 3,
Z

∞

D(v) dv − (p̃ − ξ(p̃|ω))D(ξ(p̃|ω)) = 0,
ξ(p̃|ω)

which is equivalent to
E[v|v ≥ ξ(p̃|ω)] = p̃ ⇐⇒ ξ(p̃|ω) = v −1 (p̃).
Moreover, notice that for any p ∈ [0, E[v]]
pD(v −1 (p)) = p ≥ pD



α
1−
δβω

+ !
p

and that p 7→ pD(v −1 (p)) is uniquely maximized at p = E[v], single-peakness of p 7→ D(p|p) and ξ(p̃|ω) =
v −1 (p̃) then implies that

 !
α +
−1
1−
p̃ ,
p̃D(v (p̃)) = p̃D
δβω
which in turn implies that


α
1−
δβω

+

p̃ = v −1 (p̃).
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Conversely, suppose that


α
1−
δβω

+

p̃ = v −1 (p̃).

Then ξ(p̃|ω) = v −1 (p̃) and hence, by Lemma 3,
Z ∞
Z ∞
D(v|p̃) dv =
D(v) dv − (p̃ − v −1 (p̃))D(v −1 (p̃)) = D(v −1 (p̃))(p̃ − v(v −1 (p̃))) = 0.
p̃

v −1 (p̃)

This completes the proof.

A.5



Proof of Theorem 1

We first show that any (rM , pM , σ M , ω M , {mM
t }) described in the statement of the theorem is indeed a finite
Markov perfect equilibrium. To this end, we will show that for any such tuple, there exists DM : R+ → D
such that (ω M , pM , DM ) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2. Consider three cases separately.
Case 1: β ∈ [0, β].
In this case, notice that
δβω M = δβ

αE[v]
βα
≤ α,
=
1 − γδ
β

and therefore ω M ≤ α/δβ. Consider any selection DM of ∆(·|ω M ). Since pM = E[v] and thus v −1 (pM ) = 0,
Lemma 4 implies that pM ∈ argmaxp pDM (p|p), which establishes (5). Meanwhile, by Lemma 4, it must be
that
Z ∞
DM (v|pM ) dv = 0.
pM

Moreover, given pM = E[v], Lemma 3 implies that DM (v|pM ) = D(0) = 1. Together,





Z ∞
Z
M
M
M
M M M M
sup αp D(p ) + δ γ + β
D(v) dv ω
=αp D (p |p ) + δ γ + β
D∈D

∞
M

M

D (v|p ) dv

pM

pM

=αE[v] + γδω M
=ω M
=

αpM DM (pM |pM )


R∞
1 − δ γ + β pM DM (v|p) dv

which establishes (4) and (6).
Case 2: β ∈ (β, β).
In this case, take any selection DM of ∆(·|ω M ). Notice that by definition, 1 > α/δβω M , and hence

+


α
α
M
1−
p = 1−
pM = v −1 (pM ),
δβω M
δβω M
which in turn implies that, by Lemma 4,
Z

∞

pM

DM (v|pM ) dv = 0
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and therefore,
ω

M

M

M

M

= αp D(ξ(p |ω )) + γδω

M

M

M

M

M



Z

∞

= αp D (p |p ) + δ γ + β

M

M



D (v|p ) dv ω M ,

pM

which establishes (4). Furthermore, since pβ < p, pM < δβω M p/(δβω M − α) and hence pM is the unique
maximizer of pD(ξ(p|ω M )) according to Lemma 4. Thus, by Lemma 3, (ω M , pM , DM ) satisfies (5) and (6).
Case 3: β = β.
In this case, consider any selection DM of ∆(·|ω M ). By definition, 1 > α/δβω M and


α
pM > v −1 (pM ),
1−
δβω M
and thus, by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4,

 




α
α
M M M M
M
M
−1
p D (p |p ) = p D
1−
p
≥ pD max
1−
p, v (p)
= pDM (p|p)
δβω M
δβω M
As a result, (ω M , pM , DM ) satisfies (4), (5), and (6) and therefore induces a stationary equilibrium, as desired.
We now show that for any finite Markov perfect equilibrium, its outcome (rM , pM , σ M , ω M , {mM
t }) must
M
M
M
satisfy the conditions given by Theorem 1. By Lemma 2, there exists (ω , p , D ) satisfying (4), (5), and
R∞
M t
(6) such that rM = pM DM (pM |pM ), σ M = pM DM (v|pM ) dv and mM
t = (1 + βσ ) . It follows immediately
M and pM satisfy these conditions. Thus,
that rM , σ M , {mM
t } satisfy the condition given by Theorem 1 if ω
it suffices to show that ω M , pM satisfy these conditions. To this end, notice that By Lemma 4,
+

α
−1 M
pM ≤ p,
v (p ) ≤ 1 −
(A.12)
δβω M
with at least one inequality binding. Now consider three cases separately.
Case 1: ω M ≤ α/δβ.
In this case, it immediately follows that

1−

α
δβω M

+

pM = 0 = v −1 (pM )

and hence pM = E[v], which in turn, by (4), implies that ω M = αE[v]/(1 − γδ). For this to be consistent
with ω M ≤ α/δβ, it must be that β ≤ β.
Case 2: ω M > α/δβ and

1−

α
δβω M



pM = v −1 (pM ).

(A.13)

In this case, Lemma 3 implies that
ωM = δ γ + β

!

Z


1−

α
δβω M


pM

D(v) dv ω M ,
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and hence, together with (A.12), it must be that β ∈ [β, β] and


α
1−
pM = pβ .
δβω M
Meanwhile, since (A.13) is equivalent to
ω

M

=g

β



α
1−
δβω M


p

M


,

it must be that ω M = g β (pβ ) and hence pM = v(pβ ).
Case 3: ω M > α/δβ and
pM =

δβω M
p.
δβω M − α

(A.14)

In this case, Lemma 3 implies that
ω

M


Z
=δ γ+β

∞



D(v) dv ω M ,

p

which means this case can only occur when β = β.
Together with observations that pβ = 0 if and only if β ≤ β, that pβ = p if and only if β = p, and that
the second inequality of (A.12) is equivalent to ω M ≥ g β (p), it then follows that ω M , pM must be the same
as described in Theorem 1 in all three cases. This completes the proof.


A.6

Proof of Theorem 2

e Suppose that zM =
We first show that any Markov perfect equilibrium must be finite whenever β < β.
(rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }) is a Markov perfect equilibrium outcome, and suppose that, by way of contradiction,
M
ω = ∞. Then it must be that
δ(γ + βσ M ) ≥ 1,
which in turn implies that
σM ≥

Z

∞

D(v) dv.
pβ

Meanwhile, since the total surplus is at most E[v] and since the seller’s revenue rM must be at least r∗ in
any subgame perfect equilibrium, it must be that
σ M ≤ E[v] − r∗ .
Together, we have
Z

∞

pβ

D(v) dv ≤ E[v] − r∗ ,

which is equivalent to β ≥ β̃, a contradiction.
e We first show that any infinite Markov perfect equilibrium outcome zM =
Now suppose that β ≥ β.
M = ∞ and
(rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }) must satisfy condition 2 of the theorem. Indeed, by definition, ω
mt = (γ + βσ M )t for all t, which in turn implies that δ(γ + βσ M ) ≥ 1. Rearranging, we have
σM ≥

1 − γδ
.
δβ
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Meanwhile, since the seller’s revenue in every period must be at least r∗ in any subgame perfect equilibrium,
rM ≥ r∗ . Therefore, since the efficient surplus is E[v], we have
σ M ≤ E[v] − rM ≤ E[v] − r∗ .
R∞
R∞
Furthermore, notice that since σ M = pM D(v) dv for some D ∈ D, it must be that pM D(v) dv ≥ σ M . Given
R∞
any σ and any p such that p D(v) dv ≥ σ, notice that the function
q 7→ S(q) − pq
is quasi-concave and hence the equation
S(q) − pq = σ
has at most two solutions, denoted as q(p, σ) ≤ q(p, σ). It then follows that
q(p, σ) ≤ D(p) ≤ q(p, σ)
R∞
for all D ∈ D such that p D(v) dv = σ. Moreover, since q 7→ S(q) − pq is increasing, q(·, σ) is decreasing
R∞
in p. As a result, for any D ∈ D and for any p ≥ 0 such that p D(v) dv = σ,
pD(p) ≥ pq(p, σ) ≥ (E[v] − σ)q(E[v] − σ, σ) = S(q(E[v] − σ, σ)) − σ.
Lastly, notice that by the definition of q(p, σ) and ζ(p), we have q(E[v] − σ, σ) = D(ζ(E[v] − σ)). Together,
it must be that

max S(D(ζ(E[v] − σ M ))) − σ M , r∗ ≤ rM ≤ E[v] − σ M .
R∞
In the meantime, since pM D(v) d = σ M and pM D(pM ) = rM for some D ∈ D, it must be that pM ≥ E[v]−σ M
and that
 M
r
S
− rM ≥ σM ,
pM
which is equivalent to
E[v] − σ M ≤ pM ≤

rM
,
S −1 (rM + σ M )

as desired.
Conversely, suppose that zM = (rM , σ M , ω M , pM , {mM
t }) satisfies condition 2 of the theorem. We now
construct a Markov perfect equilibrium whose outcome is zM . To this end, let the seller’s strategy be pM
for all periods and for all histories. Consider a strategy for the intermediary as follows: For any history, if
the seller charges p 6= pM in the same period, choose a solution of
min pD(p+ ).

D∈D

Otherwise, if the seller charges pM choose D ∈ D such that
D(pM ) =
and that

Z

rM
pM

∞

pM

D(v) dv = σ M .
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Using the same arguments as above, since
1 − γδ
≤σ M ≤ E[v] − r∗
δβ
rM
,
E[v] − σ M ≤pM ≤ −1 M
S (r + σ M )

max S(D(ζ(E[v] − σ M ))) − σ M , r∗ ≤rM ≤ E[v] − σ M ,
such D ∈ D exists. Finally, consider the following strategy for the tie-breaker: For any history, if the seller
chooses p 6= pM and the intermediary chooses any D ∈ D in the same period, then chooses q = D(p+ ). If
the seller chooses pM and the intermediary chooses any D ∈ D in the same period, then choose q = D(p).
By construction, the above strategy profile is Markov. Moreover, since rM ≥ r∗ and since the seller can
get at most r∗ if he deviates given the intermediary’s and the tie-breaker’s strategies, the seller would never
deviate. As for the intermediary, when the price is pM and the market size is m, by construction, the market
size in the next period is (γ + βσ M )m. Since σ M ≥ (1 − γδ)/δβ, the intermediary’s payoff is ω M = ∞ given
the seller always charges pM and given the tie-breaker’s strategy. Meanwhile, if the seller charges p 6= pM ,
then given that the seller charges pM in all future periods, choosing the solution of
min pD(p+ )

D∈D

and then return to the aforementioned strategy in future periods still gives a present discounted profit of
∞. Together, the intermediary would not deviate given the seller’s and the tie-breaker’s strategies. Thus,
this strategy profile is indeed a Markov perfect equilibrium with outcome zM .
Finally, since
1 − γδ
≤ E[v] − r∗
δβ
e Together with the proofs above,
there exists zM that satisfies condition 2 of the theorem whenever β ≥ β.
e This completes the
it then follows that there exists an infinite Markov perfect equilibrium whenever β ≥ β.
proof.


